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Illicit arms are responsible for high death rates in the Great Lakes region. The 
phenomenon of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation owes to historical 
factors, porous borders, and the prevalence of regional armed conflicts that offer markets 
for illicit arms and is compounded by poor arms management and control measures 
within the region. The effects of SALW on the social, economic, and political arenas in 
Uganda and in other states in the region are enormous. Ad hoc measures and the lack of 
regional consensus in implementation allow illicit arms to flow to homegrown terrorists. 
Although not the only cause of homegrown terrorism, SALW have remained a significant 
driver in creating a fragile security environment in which homegrown terrorism thrives. 
This thesis addresses the causes and effects of SALW proliferation in Uganda and the 
Great Lakes region. Specifically, it explores the nexus between homegrown terrorism and 
SALW proliferation. The study concludes by providing policy recommendations to 
combat homegrown terrorism and the effects of SALW proliferation in Uganda and the 
Great Lakes region.  
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Because they are easy to acquire and to use, small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) are common in most countries, especially in Africa. SALW also figure 
significantly in homegrown terrorism, insurgencies, cultures of violence, and the 
militarization of civil societies in Uganda, throughout the Horn of Africa, and across the 
entire Great Lakes Region.1  
Because of SALW in Uganda and in the Great Lakes Region, the threat of 
homegrown terrorism remains a critical challenge to the security of the state. For 
example, the attack on Kicwamba Technical Institute by the Allied Democratic Front 
(ADF) on 11 June 1998, left more than 80 students dead, 60 seriously injured, others 
abducted, and buildings set ablaze.2 Similarly, the Al-Shabaab suicide attackers 
terrorized Ugandans watching the World Soccer Championship finals in Kampala on 11 
July 2010. In this attack, Al Jazeera reported that, “86 people were killed, including nine 
Ethiopians, an Irish woman, and one Asian; more than 85 people were wounded.”3 In 
both incidents, the perpetrators took advantage of negligent security monitoring 
mechanisms and poor policing of borders to smuggle in SALW that later were used in the 
commission of terrorist activities.4  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines measures that authorities in Uganda and in the countries of 
the Great Lakes region can use to minimize the spread of small arms and light weapons, 
and combat homegrown terrorism. To this end, the thesis also asks the questions: What 
                                                 
1 “Small Arms and Light Weapons Control: A Training Manual,” Safer World, February 2012, 
http://www.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/small-arms-and-light-weapons-full.pdf. 
2 “HRW Condemns Deadly Attack by Ugandan Rebels on School Children,” Human Rights Watch, 10 
June 1998, http://www.hrw.org/news/1998/06/09/hrw-condemns-attack-ugandan-rebels-school-children. 
3 Al Jazeera, “Al-Shabaab Claims Uganda Bombings: Twin Attacks Targeting World Cup Fans in 
Kampala Kill at Least 74 People,” 13 July 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/
2010711212520826984.html. 
4 Ibid.  
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are the common causes of small arms and light weapons proliferation, and what is the 
relationship between SALW and homegrown terrorism in Uganda as well as in the 
countries of Great Lakes region? Which policies and strategic issues ought to be 
considered for future planning against the SALW and homegrown terrorism in Uganda 
and in the countries of the Great Lakes region? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Retired United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Anan describes SALW as 
“weapons of mass destruction in slow motion.”5 Edward Mogire claims that, “SALW are 
responsible for the deaths of an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 people around the world 
each year.”6 According to the UN, 80 million AK-47s are in the wrong hands.7 Moises 
Naim, in the article “The Five Wars of Globalization,” observes that, “small arms fueled 
46 out of the 49 largest conflicts in the last decade; in 2001, SALW were responsible for 
an estimated 1000 deaths a day.”8  
According to Mogire, there are various definitions of SALW, but “the most 
widely used is the definition proposed by the UN panel of experts on small arms in its 
1997 report.”9 Mogire summarizes the panel: 
Small arms include revolvers, small-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, 
submachine guns, and assault rifles. Light weapons include heavy 
machine guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles (sometimes 
mounted), portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems sometimes 
mounted, and mortars of caliber less than 100m. Ammunitions and 
explosives include cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells, and missiles 
for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single 
                                                 
5 Anup Shah, “Small Arms—They Cause 90% of Civilian Casualties,” Global Issues, last updated 
January 21, 2006. http://www.globalissue.orgwebsite. 
6 Edward Mogire, “The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Threat to 
Security,” Academia Nazionale dei Lincei, 2008, 2. www.lincei.it/rapporti/amaldi/papers/XV-Mogire.pdf. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Moises Naim, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Foreign Policy 134, no.1 (2003): 1–5, 
http://Foreign Policy.com/2009/11/035-Wars-off-globalization. 
9 Mogire, “The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” 2. 
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action anti-aircraft and anti-systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand 
grenades, land mines, and explosives.10  
Christine Beeck et al., in the Training Manual on SALW Control, refer to 
proliferation as “an illicit transfer, destabilizing, accumulation, and misuse of small arms 
and light weapons especially by non-state actors.”11  
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons remains a security concern that 
threatens global security and undermines economic development especially in the 
developing world. Typically produced in developed countries, the effects of SALW are 
graver in Third World countries, where they are used in numerous of conflicts.12  
Stability in the Great Lakes region of Africa is a significant factor in the security 
interests of the United States and the international community. The 1998 terrorist attacks 
on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya demonstrated the transnational capability 
of terrorist and therefore, the threat to U.S. interests in the East Africa.13 President 
George W. Bush acknowledged the significance of stability of African continent to U.S. 
strategic security interests and created a military command (African Command) to 
stabilize the continent.14 In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense highlights the aim 
of U.S. African Command as “to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with 
African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the 
region.”15 Henry Isoke further argues that, “a peaceful East African region will help the 
U.S. deployment of its technical assets to collect information about terrorist organizations 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Christine Beck, Lach Fergusson, and Hesta Groenewald, “Small Arms and Light Weapons Control: 
A Training Manual,” Safer World, February 2012, 7. Accessed 15 November 2016, http://docplayer.net/
8253145-small-arms-arms-and-light-weapons-control. 
12 Mogire, “Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” 2. 
13 Henry Isoke, “The Dilemma of Porous Borders: Uganda’s Experience in Fighting Terrorism,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 4. 
14 Lauren Ploch, African Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of U.S. Military in Africa 
CRS Report No. RL 34003 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 3–5, 
http://www.fpc.state.gov/document/104287.Pdf.  
15 Ibid., 4. 
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with bases in the region and also protect social, political, and economic interests of the 
United States in the East African region and the rest of the Horn of Africa.”16  
In Uganda, SALW are traded illegally and smuggled into Uganda through porous 
borders, ending up in the hands of terrorists who threaten the country and whole region. 
The geo-political position of Uganda makes it vulnerable to spillover effects from 
regional instabilities with its attendant challenges. For example, the absence of peace in 
South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi, and 
Somalia facilitates the proliferation of SALW to Uganda. The illegal guns that enter the 
country end up in the hands of terrorist organizations and can facilitate the recruitment 
and arming of terrorists. For example, Al-Qaeda and local indigenous terrorists pose a 
challenge to regional stability and will threaten the United States in form of direct attacks 
on American personnel or American facilities.17  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This section seeks to examine the sources of SALW, the effects of SALW 
proliferation, and the connection to homegrown terrorism. It traces the problem of SALW 
from a global perspective to the national level. 
There is debate among scholars about the relationship between SALW and 
insecurity; some writers argue that SALW directly lead to insecurity, while others 
consider SALW as mere triggers or catalyzing factors.18 Both sides of the argument 
conceptually recognize that the implications of SALW proliferation on national security 
are undesirable. Osimen Goddy Uwa et al., in their work, “Small Arms and Light 
Weapons Proliferation and Problems of National Security in Nigeria,” associates SALW 
proliferation with an increase in terrorist activities and local criminality among states.19 
                                                 
16 Isoke, “Dilemma of Porous Borders,” 4. 
17 David H. Shinn, “Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn of Africa,” Foreign Service 
Journal 36 (September 2004), 42. http://addisvoice.com/ia%20Meles/
Terrorism%20in%20Horn%20Shinn.pdf. 
18 Ibid, 18. 
19 Osimen, et al., “Small Arms and Weapons Proliferation and Problems of National Security in 
Nigeria,” International Affairs and Global Strategy 29 (2015):15–18. 
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Thus, he argues, the SALW phenomenon is both cause and consequence of the fragility 
of security situations in Africa.20 In addition, Mogire contends: 
The uncontrolled proliferation and stockpiling of SALW before, during 
and following violent conflicts has led to many regions being flooded with 
small arms with devastating consequences on individual (human), national 
and international security. SALW are the primary instrument of violence, 
have prolonged or aggravated conflicts, produced massive flows of 
refugees, undermined law and rules spawned a culture of violence and 
impunity.21  
The views are similarly divided with regards to the relationship between SALW 
and homegrown terrorism and armed violence. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), in its study on “Violence, Crime, and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia,” 
presents two arguments concerning the management of SALW.22 One school of thought, 
headed by scholars like Conwell, Miller, and Slovak, argues that small arms in private 
hands significantly increase homegrown terrorism and other related atrocities.23  
In contrast, Lott and Mustard argue that small arms in the hands of private 
citizens reduce the possibility of local criminality and homegrown terrorism.24 Taking 
the United States as an example, they assert that armed violence casualties are higher in 
countries where arms are prohibited compared to states where they are accepted.25 The 
security narrative of providing guns to private citizens as deterrence to local insecurity is 
far removed from the African reality where presence of guns in private hands translates 
into increased armed conflicts, consequently homegrown terrorism.26 Zebulon Takwa, in 
“Small Arms proliferation poses challenge in West Africa,” agrees with Ogu and 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Mogire, “Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” 1. 
22 Pablo Dupuy Casa, Calvani Sandro, and Stefen Liller. “Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms 
Trafficking in Colombia.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006), 16. 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Michael I. Ogu, “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: Cause or Effect,” 
International Political Science Association, 2014, 4, http://www.paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/
paper_33138.pdf. 
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observes that the rising level of insecurity in Africa is partly linked to mismanagement of 
SALW.27 Africa is faced with the challenge of weak institutions for monitoring and 
tracking undercover modus operandi of SALW traffickers and management of private 
arms.28  
The concept of small arms and light weapons proliferation is further understood 
within the context of nontraditional security threats.29 Divya Srikanth, in his journal 
article, “Non-Traditional Security Threats in the 21st Century: A Review,” 
conceptualized SALW as a nontraditional threat that challenges global security.30 He 
further asserts that the 21st century is more subject to nontraditional threats—terrorism, 
SALW, poverty, money laundering, and the effects of unequal distribution of resources—
rather than conventional threats.31  
Similarly, Don Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, in their work “Seeking Security 
in Insecure World,” both attest that “today’s security agenda includes the first and second 
generation of human rights, global warming, and oil shortages; transnational organized 
criminal groups, SALW proliferation, and global networks of terrorist.”32 In the same 
vein, Mogire captures the impact of SALW on human security imperatives.33 He writes:  
The death toll from small arms dwarfs all other weapons systems, and in 
most years greatly exceeds the toll of atomic bombs that devastated 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in terms of the carnage they cause. Small arms 
proliferation indeed could well be described as weapons of mass 
destruction. Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is 
also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of 
                                                 
27 Zebulon Takwa, “Small Arms Proliferation Poses a Challenge in West Africa,” Focus on Arms in 
Africa 3, no. 1 (2004): 7, https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/newsletters/focus/vol3 no 1 _04/takwa.pdf. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Mogire, “The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” 4. 
30 Divya Srikanth. “Non-Traditional Security Threats in the 21st Century: A Review,” International 
Journal of Development and Conflict 4, no. 1 (June 2014), 61. http://www.ijdc./uploads/1/7/5/7/17570463/
2014junearticle4.pdf. 
31 Ibid., 60. 
32 Don Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Seeking Security in an Insecure World (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 1. 
33 Mogire, “The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” 4. 
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small arms sustains and acerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peace 
keepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for International 
humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and it 
benefits terrorists as well as the perpetrators of organized crime.34  
 
The proliferation of SALW fuels conflicts, frustrates development and 
humanitarian efforts, undermines international law, and subsequently erodes the 
legitimacy of governments, paving the way for homegrown terrorists and organized 
crime.35 Rachel Stohl observes further that:  
Armed groups often block transit routes, disrupt natural resource 
exploitation, and attack key national industries. Donor supported projects 
can be halted or cancelled due to security concerns about increased gun 
violence and crime. The destabilizing presence of small arms discourages 
foreign investment and tourism.36  
Ken Booth, in his article “A Security Regime in South Africa: Theoretical 
Considerations,” supplements the idea that human security is more concerned with such 
nontraditional threats as disease, hunger, and protection from man-made disasters. 
Therefore, reducing the human cost of SALW proliferation is a critical undertaking.37  
Furthermore, different bodies of literature link transnational organized crime to 
homegrown terrorism in the sense that both derived their strength from lawlessness and 
insecurity fueled by SALW.38 Scholars like Tamara Makarenko argue that the decline of 
the state-sponsored terrorism created a gap, which transnational organized crime filled as 
significant player in homegrown terrorism.39 For example in Latin America, narco-
                                                 
34 Ibid., 5. 
35 Rachel Stohl, “Targeting Children: Small Arms and Children in Conflict,” The Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 9, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 284–286, 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Targeting%20Children-
%20Small%20Arms%20and%20Children%20in%20Conflict.pdf 
36 Ibid., 284. 
37 Ken Booth, “A Security Regime in South Africa: Theoretical Considerations,” Southern Africa 
Perspectives no.30, CSAS (1994), 4, https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/staff/academic/kob. 
38 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing Interplay between Transnational 
Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no.1 (2004), http://www.tand-online.com/DOI -
10.1080/174405704200029725/abc. 
39 Ibid., 6 
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terrorism provides a nexus between homegrown terrorism and transnational organized 
crime.40 In the same vein, a U.S. National Security Council briefing paper on 
transnational organized crime41 underscores the increased connection between terrorism 
and crime. The report observed that terrorists are resorting to transnational organized 
crimes to finance their activities.42 The report further highlights the involvement of the 
Taliban in the drug trade, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 
Hezbollah, Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb, and Al Shabaab engagement in piracy to 
generate funds for their terrorist operations.43 Transnational organized crime also 
accounts for the transfer of SALW to terrorist groups to achieve their illicit goals; 
homegrown terrorists use the same arms to bolster their operational capabilities.44  
The UNODC assessment study45 further assesses the connection between the 
organized crimes and homegrown terrorism. The study underpins the growing 
interconnections between transnational organized crime and terrorism.46 It notes that, 
“the collusion between insurgents and criminal groups in Central Africa, the Sahel, and 
Central South East Asia fuels terrorism and plunders resources.”47 In addition, the report 
further reveals that the Transnational Organized Criminals are often sources and conduits 
of SALW.48 It cites the example of the United States, where “88 percent of fire arm 
murders in 2008 were committed with handguns; 87 percent of all violent crimes are 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 “Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security,” U.S. 
National Security Council. 27 May 2016, http://www.whitehouse.gov/admin/eop/nsc/transnational -crime-
threat. 
42 Ibid., 26–30. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Globalized Crime: The Transnational Threat 
Assessment” (2010), 129. Accessed 27 May 2016, http://www.org.unodc/unodc/en/data-and -analyst-
tocota-2010.html. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid., 129–134. 
48 Ibid. 
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offenses related to fire arms that are often diverted from markets that exist in many 
countries.”49  
The head of UNODC further remarks: 
Crime networks and illicit armed dealers play an important role in the 
black market, while terrorists and drug traffickers procure some of their 
weapons. It has been estimated that approximately 1.58 billion U.S. 
dollars in 2006 were under recorded by illicit transactions, making up 
another 100 million U.S. dollars or so, the most common cited estimate of 
the illicit market is 10–20% of illicit market. These illicit arms face the 
violence that undermines security development and justice worldwide. 
U.S. federal law enforcement agencies have intercepted large numbers of 
weapons and all related items being smuggled to China, Russia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen.50  
The study conveys the compatibility of transnational organized crime and 
terrorism. Homegrown terrorism may be able to access the SALW from transnational 
organized cartels either through stealing, hiring, or purchasing.51 This scenario relates to 
the African situation in which transnational organized crime has become intertwined with 
homegrown terrorism and the proliferation of SALW by taking advantage of failing 
states, civil conflicts, and the presence of ungoverned spaces.52  
Abu Bakarr Bah, in his work, “State Decay: A conceptual Frame of Failing and 
Failed States in West Africa,” argues that failing states fuel political violence and an 
inability to provide security to its own citizen and protect its territorial sovereignty.53 
Africa’s experience with failing states and SALW bears out this assumption. The fall of 
Said Barre’s regime in 1992 left about 500,000 arms in the hands of competing 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 130. 
52 Philip K. Chebbet, A Security Problem in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa: 
Proliferation of SALW (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002), 5. 
53 Abu Bakarr Bah, “State Decay: A Conceptual Frame of Failing and Failed States in West Africa.”  
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 25, no. 1/3 (2012): 72, doi: 10.1007/s10767-012-
9120-9. 
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warlords.54 Similarly, the collapse of the Libyan state led to an increased militarization of 
opposition groups, radical movements, local terrorists groups, and insurgents ready to 
spread instability to the rest of the continent. The SALW proliferated from the Libyan 
conflict to percolate into Islamic militant groups in Sub- Saharan Africa that are affiliated 
to Al-Qaida like Al Shabaab in Somalia.55 Boko-Haram also relied partly on arms from 
Libya that substantially increased their firepower to take on Nigerian government 
forces.56 Similarly, Tuaregs expanded into SALW to boost their resistance against the 
government of Mali.57 Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mali National 
Liberation Army (MANLA) used arms proliferated from Libya to boost domestic 
terrorism in the Maghreb region and West Africa.58  
The ease of use of small arms coupled with the involvement numbers of armed 
conflict in Africa has resulted in the occurrence of a gun culture that is a significant 
driver of internal conflicts.59 Isiaka Alan Badmus, in his study on “Arms Proliferation 
and Conflicts in Africa,” concurs that “the intractability of African conflicts is due to 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons.”60 He adds that, “the growing 
uncontrolled trade in SALW has made the resolution of conflict in Africa a mammoth 
task.”61  
Nekabari Johnson and Gbara Pabon assert that African conflicts are complicated 
and instigated by the uncontrolled trade in SALW, “often paid for by the illegal 
                                                 
54 Michael Renner, Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament (Washington, DC: 
World Watch Institute, 1997), 36, http://www.metabase.net/docs/fusades/18235.html. 
55 Renner, “Small Arms, Big Impact: The next Challenge of Disarmament,” 36. 
56 Abe Greenwald, “Un-Secured Libyan Weapons Went to Boko Haram,” Commentary Magazine 
(May 2014), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign- policy/Africa/unsecured Libyan weapons.  
57 Daniel Larison, “The Libyan Wars Effects on Mali,” The American Conservative (2012), accessed 
2 August 2016, http;//www.theamericanconservative.com/…/the-libyan-wars-effects-on-mail  
58 Ibid. 
59 Shah Anup, “Conflicts in Africa- Introduction” Global Issues. Last updated May 12, 2010,  
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/83/conflicts-in-africa.  
60 Alan Badmus Isiaka, “Managing Arms in Peace Process: ECOWAS and the West African Civil 
Conflict” (2009), 18–21, http://www.africanos.eu/ceaup/aploads/wp_2009_01.pdf. 
61 Ibid. 
 11
exploitation of resources.”62 Nekabari points out that the interests of transnational 
cooperation in diamonds prolonged conflicts in Angola.63 Likewise, the conflicts in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia were fueled by the exchange of SALW and minerals.64  
Rigobert Minani Bihuzo contends that “conflicts in the Great Lakes region persist 
because of complex regional conflicts, financial incentives, ethnic polarization, and weak 
and illegitimate governments.”65 He argues, as an example that the presence of foreign 
troops and proxy support for militias continue to frustrate conflict resolution efforts in 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.66 A fragile and lawless situation erodes 
government legitimacy, thus creating a safe haven for homegrown terrorists. The 
conflicts in Africa are driven by competition for illicit exploitation of natural resources.67 
Porous borders and the entry of new actors facilitate the SALW trade, and the proceeds 
from such illicit exploitation funds homegrown terrorism.68 
The Angolan example demonstrates this assertion: 
The Transnational Corporations are interested in the natural resources of 
countries in Africa. For example, National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) was able to finance its military 
campaign through the illegal sale of diamonds. UNITA controlled two-
thirds of Angolan diamonds, especially the diamond-rich Luanda Norte 
province, and between 1992 and 1997, UNITA was estimated to have 
earned $3.7 billion from the sale of diamonds. In return for the diamonds, 
UNITA received a steady flow of small arms and light weapons.69  
                                                 
62 Johnson Nakibari, Nna, and Baribene Gbara Pabon, “Arms Proliferation and Conflicts in Africa: 
The Sudan Experience” Editorial Board 6, no. 1 (July 2012): 213 http://www.african journal-org/wp-
content-uploads/arms proliferation. 
63 Ibid., 8. 
64 Ibid., 215. 
65 Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, “Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes,” Africa 
Security Brief, no. 21 (July 2012): 2, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/147787/AfricaBriefFinal_21.pdf. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 2–4. 
67 Nekabari, “Arms Proliferation and Conflicts in Africa,” 213. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 214. 
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Similarly, the war situation in eastern DRC provides a space for illicit exchange 
of small arms for natural resources between SALW cartels and local indigenous militias. 
Terrorist groups like the ADF have taken advantage of building to their capability to 
terrorize Uganda.70  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESIS 
SALW proliferation at the global level threatens the sovereignty of states both at 
the macro and micro levels. Uncontrolled proliferation puts SALW in the hands of 
civilians, outside state control, which poses a serious threat of homegrown and 
international terrorism in Uganda and in the Great Lakes region. For close to four 
decades, Uganda has experienced a great increase of small arms expanded within the 
country and across the porous borders of southern Sudan and Kenya.71 SALW are widely 
used in the commission of crimes like terrorism, civil conflicts, violent activities, and 
cattle rustling, which threaten national security in many ways. 
SALW proliferation has continued to promote homegrown terrorism because 
local terrorists can easily access the guns sold on illegal markets, and the prevailing 
political situation has created an environment that is insecure, thus undermining 
economic development of Uganda and its neighboring countries.72 Hypothetically 
stopping SALW proliferation must go hand-in-hand with economic development and 
enhancement of security. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study analyzes such major causes of SALW proliferation as failed states, 
ungoverned spaces, insurgencies, conflicts, and political instability in the region—among 
                                                 
70 Bihuzo, “Unfinished Business,” 4. 
71 Nene Mburu, “The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkan Districts: The Case 
for Appropriate Disarmament Strategies,” (2001), http://www.info.southsudanngoforum.org/dataset/the-
proliferation-of-guns-and. 
72 National Focal Point, “Mapping the Small Arms Problem in Uganda: The Development of Uganda 
National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons,” Safer World (May 2007), 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/UgandaMapping.pdf. 
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others—to understand how SALW promote homegrown terrorism in Uganda and the 
region. The proposed research focuses on policy and strategic issues that should be 
considered for future planning against the proliferation of SALW and domestic terrorism. 
In addition, this research focuses on various strategies to stop proliferation of 
SALW, and suggests effective measures to combat homegrown terrorism that is threatening 
the region. To this end, this research examines secondary scholarship on SALW, and 
consults such terrorism-related studies as government reports, policy documents, and other 
strategic policy approaches that have been put in place to address the threat of terrorism. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter I provides the introduction that covers 
the background of small arms and light weapons proliferation, and how it is related to 
homegrown terrorism in Uganda and the Great Lakes region. In addition, it provides the 
literature review and the research design. Chapter II looks at the causes of SALW 
proliferation and its effects in Uganda. Chapter III examines measures to stop SALW 
proliferation and evaluates counter-terrorism policies in relation to homegrown terrorism. 
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II. CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT 
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN UGANDA  
Like most African countries, Uganda has a political history that is checkered with 
turmoil and armed conflict. Uganda experienced numerous military coups d’état and a 
series of insurgencies after its independence in 1962. The vicious cycle of violence 
weakened the state and created a fragile security situation that favored the illicit 
circulation of SALW. As Michael I. Ogu observes, the proliferation of SALW is 
“principally a consequence of conflicts at whatever level and in whatever magnitude.”73 
Various belligerents competed for arms to protect themselves; likewise, criminal 
elements capitalized on security lapses and acquired arms for their own self-interests—
usually illegal.74 During the event in northern and eastern Uganda, the population took 
advantage of the violent changes of regimes to obtain guns illegally for either self-
protection or economic gain. Such weapons often fell into the hands of homegrown 
terrorists. 
This chapter examines the causes and effects of SALW proliferation in Uganda 
and the Great Lakes region of Africa. It considers the historical influences as well as 
domestic and regional political factors that explain the SALW situation there today. It 
also discusses the various ways that SALW proliferation affects all levels of state and 
society in Uganda. 
A. CAUSES OF SALW IN UGANDA 
The problem of SALW proliferation in Uganda has many causes—some 
historical, some governmental, and some geo-political; some not wholly of its own 
making. This section examines the leading factors or causes of SALW in Uganda and the 
Great Lakes region.  
 
                                                 
73 Michael “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: Cause or Effect?”  3–6. 
.74 Ibid. 
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1. Historical Factors 
The phenomenon of small arms proliferation in Uganda started with the country’s 
initial contacts with outsiders, especially Arab slave traders from the east African coast. 
The issue later became prominent with the advent of the colonial powers. The current 
patterns of SALW can partly be explained amid the influence of world wars and effect of 
the Cold War. 
a. Pre-Colonial Background and Ethno-Militarism 
The proliferation of SALW in Uganda can be traced from the pre-colonial 
background and ethno-militarism of pastoralist communities of East Africa and the Horn 
of Africa.75 Nene Mburu remarks that earlier in the 19th century, before the coming of 
imperialist powers, herding communities in the Horn of Africa and East African regions 
came to stage—and repel—cross-ethnic raids using guns acquired from Ethiopian gun 
runners, Arabs, slave traders, poachers, and business merchants on the coast of East 
Africa.76 Arms were mostly bought from gun markets in Maji, in southwestern 
Ethiopia.77  
The increased demand for guns in the region, due to civil conflicts, transformed 
the concept of gun ownership to an economic venture, thus creating an entry point for 
SALW proliferation to other parts of the Horn of Africa and east African regions. This 
phenomenon was particularly marked among the pastoralist communities of Karamoja 




                                                 
75 Nene Mburu, “The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkana Districts: The Case 
for Appropriate Disarmament Strategies.” Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 
no. 2 (December 2002): 6–7, http://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/./Guns.pdf.  
76 Ibid., 6-7. 
77 Ibid., 8. 
 17
Figure 1. Map of Uganda highlighting Karamoja region as an epicenter of 
SALW in Uganda.78 
 
b. Colonial Legacy 
The colonial policy of isolating the pastoral districts of Karamoja and Turkan 
from the central administration crystallized armed culture in the region. The British 
created the republics of Kenya and Uganda in 1926 and created a border that suddenly 
divided the two traditional communities that had lived together and shared such resources 
as land and water.79 Colonial policy demanded the two tribes be confined in their new 
border—and that they lay down their guns if they were to get protection and services 
                                                 
78 Adapted from “Uganda,” Google Maps, accessed 15 Nov 2016, www.lonely.com/maps/Africa/
Uganda. 
79 Mburu, “The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkan Districts.” 9. 
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from the British colonial administration.80 The communities refused to give up their guns 
peaceably, so the British embarked on a campaign of forceful disarmament, code-named 
Operation Tennis in 1920. The operation ultimately failed due to poor planning, and the 
tribes kept their arms.81  
In reaction, the Karamoja and Turkan regions were ring-fenced and declared 
“closed districts.”82 Clan leaders used the policy to stoke ethnic nationalism, which in 
turn, justified the acquisition of more guns, both to protect livestock and to defend tribal 
territories from invaders. Nene Mburu elaborates: 
Neglecting these two peoples has strengthened gun culture, which they see 
as a source of security, livelihood, and status. On the one hand, 
communities that have not benefitted from government-supplied arms feel 
the gun is a safeguard from domination and dispossession, not just by the 
immediate pastoral neighbour, but also by the predatory state.83  
Arms proliferation in Karamoja was also motivated by the low standard of living 
there, as the colonial administration and other entrepreneurs expropriated their land 
without providing an alternative to benefit the local people.84 In the face of such 
marginalization, the gun became the most viable means of survival for the communities 
to compete for limited resources and safeguard their meager incomes. This dynamic 
intensified inter-ethnic rivalries and raids.85  
c. Influence of World War II 
Some writers, like Mburu, subscribe to the view that the participation of 
Karamojongo and Turkana tribes in World War II amplified the circulation of small arms 
                                                 
80 Mburu, “The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkan Districts.” 5. 
81 Ibid., 5–10. 
82 Ibid.  
83 Mburu, “Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History, and Political Implications” 
(1999), 89–91, http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol8num2/mburu.pdf. 
84 Mburu, “The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkana Districts: The Case for 
Appropriate Disarmament Strategies in Karamoja,” 6–7. 
85 Kennedy Agade Mkutu, “Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley: Pastoral Conflicts and Small 
Arms” (Oxford: James Curry, 2008), 17. 
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in the region.86 Specifically, the tribes participated in the war between Ethiopia and Italy 
and during the attack of Abyssinia.87 The Turkan fought for the British against the 
Italians; the 25th East African Brigade led the invasion of Abyssinia that was stationed in 
the Turkan District.88 Correspondingly, the Karamojong, who served in the King African 
Rifles during military campaign in Africa and Asia, gained both skills and arms in the 
war that they relied on to rejuvenate their long-time traditional ambitions of inter-clan 
raids and territorial expansion.89 The two pastoral communities built their paramilitary 
capabilities and increased their raids because of acquired SALW and skills gained from 
the colonial wars.90  
d. Cold War Proxy Conflicts 
Throughout the Cold War, the rival super powers provided arms and ammunitions 
to assist their proxy interstate conflicts in Africa.91 For example, in an effort to counter 
the U.S. support for Somalia and influence in the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union 
provided an assortment of arms and ammunitions to Somalia and made generous 
unconditional loans; similarly, the Soviet Union provided weapons and other military 
assistance to Ethiopia during the Ogaden War with Somalia in 1976.92  
Similarly, the power struggle after the Cold War destroyed the state apparatus in 
DRC and consequently the country fell into a spiral of conflict that eroded the state’s 
legitimacy, encouraging the existence of tribal militias, terrorists, and other transnational 
organized crime. The dire wartime economic situation in eastern DRC further facilitated 
SALW proliferation in the Great Lakes region by creating a fragile security environment 
                                                 
86 Mkutu, “Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley,” 12. 
87 Mburu, “Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa,” 10. 
88 Mburu, “The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkan Districts,” 9. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Mburu, “Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa,”  
91 Ibid., 11–14. 
92 Gebru Tareke, “The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited.” The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 33, no. 3 (2000): 635–667. doi: 10.2307/3097438. 
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that saw the emergency of various private militia groups and tribal chiefs, each 
competing to acquire arms for both resource acquisition and self-defense.  
Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, arms ended up in the wrong hands—
illegal business dealers of SALW, militia armed groups based on ethnicity, private owned 
military companies, and local and international smugglers—thereby facilitating ongoing 
armed political conflicts in northern Uganda, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Burundi.93 The abrupt increase in interstate conflict generated an irresistible demand for 
the SALW; they became weapons of choice because of their portability and accessibility.  
2. Regional Political Factors 
Uganda’s position in the region renders it vulnerable to SALW proliferation. 
Small arms dealers take advantage of poorly policed tri-border situations to infiltrate the 
country. Figure 2 shows how small arms move from neighboring countries into Uganda, 
and how they are moved further in the country.94 
                                                 
93“Peace, Security, and Governance in Great Lakes Region,” Office of the Special Representative of 
the United Nations Secretary General for the Great Lakes Region. (2003), https://www.ipinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/peace_security-1.pdf.  
94 Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and light Weapons, “Uganda National Action for 
Arms Management and Disarmament,” (2012-2017), 10. 
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Figure 2. Map of Uganda showing illegal routes and movement of SALW.95 
 
Uganda is positioned along the gun corridor stretching from Somalia, Southern 
Sudan, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and North-Eastern Uganda. This 
geographic situation coupled with emergence of terrorism—Al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
Al-Shabaab, sea pirates in the Indian Ocean—continue to stoke the market, hence 
increasing the demand for the proliferated SALW.96 The residual elements of Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and Allied Defense Forces continue to expand SALW to 
Uganda. The emerging “trends of urban terrorism and armed violence also fuel the 
demand for firearms for both personal protection and illicit activities.”97  
Intra- and interstate conflicts in the region also continue to create an environment 
that facilities easy proliferation of SALW. These relentless conflicts can favor illegal 
                                                 
95  Adapted from Uganda National Focal Point, “Uganda National Action Plan for Arms Management 
and Disarmament,” 10. 
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exchange of arms by increasing the demand for small arms, illegal trading of firearms, 
ownership, and mismanagement of SALW, and associated effects are more complex to 
control.98 The current political crisis in Burundi, the security stalemate in South Sudan, 
and the myriad of conflicts in eastern DRC remain potential triggers and sources of small 
arms proliferation. Terrorists and illegal arms cartels take an advantage of lawlessness to 
proliferate arms to their targeted countries. Richard Nabudere observes: 
Weapons have reached Uganda all the way from Somalia through Ethiopia 
and northern Kenya. Somalia has been stateless for over a decade and is 
now controlled by heavily armed warlords. Kenya’s North and Rift 
provinces, as well as Uganda’s northeastern Karamoja region, are all 
awash with tens of thousands of automatic weapons in easy reach 
of Aru.99  
Rachel Stohl supports this argument with an example of the civil wars in Ethiopia 
in 1979, Rwanda genocide in 1994, Somalia in 1994 and Uganda in 1979 and 1986 in 
addition to other conflicts in Africa that are accountable for the roaming of illicit small 
arms in the region.100 The current armed violence in South Sudan is being escalated by 
infiltration of SALW from diverse sources on either side of the conflict and to some 
extent, non-state actors. 
Uganda contends with an increased case of SALW trafficked from fragile 
neighboring countries. The research done by the Uganda Action Plan on Small Arms 
reveals a number of distinguished arms traffickers and trading routes for small arms 
flowing into Uganda, many other involved nations nearby have been affected by conflicts 
and instabilities.101 The study highlights the following major transit routes: 
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Officials reported well-established arms markets along the Sudan-Uganda 
border, as well as trading routes from Southern Sudan to the Kenya-
Uganda border area. Arms from Southern Sudan were reported to be a 
major source of weapons fueling pastoralist conflicts on both sides of the 
border (particularly North Eastern and Mid-Eastern Uganda and North 
Western Kenya). In addition, officials reported that some small arms from 
Somalia and Ethiopia were being trafficked into North Eastern Uganda, 
via Kenya. Small arms were also reportedly transferred to the LRA in the 
North from the Government of Sudan. Law enforcement officials also 
reported that conflicts in the DRC were contributing to arms flows into 
Uganda, particularly in the North Western and Western regions.102  
Arms that state purchases legally end up in black market due to corruption and 
poor arms tracking systems, and continue to abet homegrown terrorism and transnational 
crimes.103 Figure 3 shows vast porous borders with Kenya, South Sudan, DRC, 
Tanzania, and Rwanda, and displays how they are used to transfer illicit SALW. 
                                                 
102 Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NFP), “Marking the Small 
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Figure 3. Map of Uganda showing prominent porous borders with DRC, 
Kenya, and South Sudan.104  
 
3. Domestic Factors  
Poor management of state arms stores and shoddy record keeping contributed to 
circulation of small arms to illegal users. Several bodies of research however, refer to the 
matheniko raid on Moroto barracks after the fall of the Amin regime in 1979, as a spring 
board of the proliferation of small arms in Karamoja.105 In the wake of this event, an 
estimated 60,000 SALW entered illicit circulation.106 Bevan J. Crisis “highlights the 
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same raid as marking a shift to state-of-the-art automatic weapons, leading to an upsurge 
in intra-tribal aggravated raiding.”107  
Bevan’s study cites South Sudan as the major starting point of illicit small arms 
and ammunition in Karamoja.108 The study further observes that SALW are proliferated 
through Toposa clans and the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to the 
Karamoja region from where they are sold to other areas.109 Arguably, the inter-ethnic 
linkages leveraged by geographical proximity continue to facilitate easy proliferation of 
SALW in the tri border communities of Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda. 
The pro-Ugandan government militias and auxiliary forces in the eastern part of 
Uganda between 2006 and 2010 also played an active role in the proliferation of SALW. 
On the basis of the arms and ammunition data collected in 2006, Bevan reveals credible 
evidence linking the illicit transfer of an estimated 1000 rounds of lose ammunition and 
400 small arms from Uganda’s military and auxiliary forces to the Karamojong—because 
the amount of arms and ammunition available in Karamoja nearly matched with those in 
the hands of national security forces.110 Bevan further notes that “the evidence that a 
certain type of poor-quality Ugandan-manufactured ammunition displayed—which had 
been criticized by some members of the security forces—appeared to be circulating 
among the Karamojong, suggesting that the state forces may have been ‘off-loading’ this 
ammunition on the illicit market.”111  
Philip K. Chebbet adds that some SALW are acquired from within the states by 
deserters, auxiliary forces, local defense armed forces, and demobilized soldiers.112 The 
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assertions of Chebbet are empirically evident in Uganda where the government does not 
have established monitoring and control mechanisms for small arms. Security personnel 
illegally exchanged small arms with non-state actors for individual benefit. Poor 
procedures, inadequate facilities, and effective oversight mechanisms to control and 
monitor state arms, is another major source of illegal firearms that police officers and 
army officers rent out for economic gains.113 These hired weapons are used in criminal 
activities such as murder, kidnap for ransom, and robbery. In addition, desertion from the 
Ugandan police and army is another major contributing factor of illegal firearms that 
cause violence and other related problems.114  
The majority of illicit SALW in circulation were left behind because of a vicious 
cycle of conflicts that bedeviled Uganda since independence.115 Significant amounts of 
SALW were acquired from the abandoned stockpiles during and after several armed 
conflict. The military coup of 1971, the collapse of Ida Amin regime in 1979, followed 
by military 1985 coup by military junta, and finally the removal of military junta by 
National Resistance Army through a protracted guerrilla war in 1986 left many guns in 
the hands of people. These violent armed conflicts left many illegal arms in the 
communities either by fleeing soldiers, or acquired by individuals for self- 
aggrandizement. Various writers on SALW in Uganda support the view that SALW 
abandoned during such conflicts. The arms kept recycling from one region to another, 
continuing its disastrous effects to the society.116 The Regional Police Commander 
(RPC) in the North Western region found out that, the major source of SALW in the 
region, were arms that remained in the possession of former soldiers during military 
coups and the fall of regimes in Uganda.117  
                                                 
113 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons” (2000), http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2000/11/1873_en.pdf. 
114 Ibid.  
115 Abdulla Bujra, “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment,” 
(2002), 20. 
116 Ibid. 
117 National Focal Point, “Uganda National Action Plan on Small Arms” http://mia.go.ug/sites/
default/files/Departments/National focal point (2012), 7. 
 27
Quoting the Regional Police Commander in the National Action Plan thus: 
In the mid-western region, it is reported that during the Amin era and the 
war to topple him, Ugandan soldiers fled from southern and western parts 
of the country passing through the mid-western region en route to the 
north. In the process, many SALW were deposited in the region.118  
B. EFFECTS OF SALW IN UGANDA 
SALW proliferation not only leads to underdevelopment, but is a consequence of 
it. Major challenges related with small arms proliferation and economic stagnation and 
underdevelopment in general, include ineffective institutions, limited educational 
opportunities, and unemployment, organized crime, and human rights abuses.119 Small 
arms proliferation is responsible for prolonged armed cattle rustling in Karamoja sub 
region and neighboring countries of Sudan and Kenya.120 The proliferation and 
trafficking of illicit arms is a core security challenge for stability of all African states 
including Uganda.121 The effects of small arms and light weapons proliferation can be 
discussed in three main categories: national stability and development; social 
development, and governance.  
1. Effects of SALW on National Stability and Development 
The wide spread of small arms in Acholi subregion, Karamoja, and Ruwenzori 
region in western Uganda has perpetuated conflict and under-development. There is 
credible evidence that the relationship is causal, rather than just coincidence—that is, the 
surfeit of small arms impedes national development and exacerbates the conditions that 
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perpetuate the poverty and instability. It is estimated that between 2004 and 2006, 1,000 
people died in cattle rustling conflicts, and all perpetrators used small arms.122  
The prevalence of insecurity associated with cattle rustling and armed criminals 
on highways continue to frustrate national development programs and leads to loss and 
displacement of both people and livestock. The study on underdevelopment in Karamoja 
reveals that the majority of children and women on streets of major towns of Uganda— 
estimated at more than 20,000—are from the Karamoja region.123 According to the 
World Bank report 2006, “82 percent of the Karamojong are living below poverty 
compared to a national average of 31 percent. Access to sanitation is only 9 percent 
compared to the national average of 62 percent, and the literacy rate is 11 percent 
compared to 67 percent at the national level.”124  
Northern Uganda also has suffered from the consequences of conflict triggered by 
SALW. It is estimated that 1.7 million people in the Acholi subregion and Lango 
subregion in northern Uganda live in camps because of insecurity caused by LRA. It is 
also estimated that by 2004, 333,000 people were living in camps because of the 
insecurity caused by several attacks by LRA and by Karamoja raids.125  
The use of SALW by Karamojong through cattle raids disrupted the development 
and family coping system in the neighbouring districts of the Teso subregion. In addition, 
SALW in the hands of Karamoja disrupted the economic development in the neighboring 
areas of eastern Uganda. A study on the impact of cattle raids on development in eastern 
Uganda reveals: 
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Persistent insecurity—marked by the occurrence of violent incidents such 
as killing, rape, and ambushes—has restricted movement and kept people 
at home, unable to trade, move their animals, or cultivate their gardens. 
The theft of productive assets and sources of capital—including cattle, 
animals for traction, farming equipment, household goods, and crops—
have undermined community members’ ability to be economically self-
sufficient. Finally, families have lost loved ones who would otherwise be 
able to contribute to the household economy.126 
2. Effects of SALW on Social Stability 
Widespread use of SLAW by non-state actors in Uganda significantly disrupts 
social development, especially in conflict-ridden areas. For instance, at the height of the 
LRA insurgency in northern Uganda, an estimated number of 2.4 million people were 
living in Internally Displaced Peoples’ Camps, while 20,000 children are believed to have 
been abducted and conscripted as child combatants and sex slaves.127 The conflict 
destroyed family fabric and its entire copping system like weakening land tenure system 
consequently leading to food insecurity, poor health, and unemployment especially 
among the youth. 
SALW in Uganda instigated cases of armed violence and insurgencies that 
directly impact on social economic development. For instance, regions like Teso 
subregion, West Nile, and Acholi, which are situated adjacent to the northern border with 
South Sudan, are susceptible to effects of SALW and have remained undeveloped. 
Similar circumstances prevail in the Ruwenzori region in southwestern Uganda, which 
grapples with roaming illegal weapons from tribal militias in eastern DRC. The recurrent 
inter-clan skirmishes between the two dominant tribes—Bakojo and Bamba—are 
catalyzed the prevalence of small guns in the region.128  
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In addition, Mogire argues that small arms cause death of many civilians in any 
conflict and “violate human rights such as torture, rape, intimidation, and looting.”129 
Quoting Kofi Anan, Mogire further argues:  
Small arms are widely used in conflicts in which the high proportion of 
causalities are civilians, and in which violence has been perpetrated in 
gross violation of international law. This has led to millions of deaths, 
injuries, displacement of population, and suffering and insecurity around 
the world. Although accumulations of weapons of such weapons by them 
do not cause conflicts in which they are used, their easy availability tends 
to exacerbate and increase the lethality of the conflicts and obstruct 
development and relief assistance efforts.130  
The effects of two decades of insurgency in northern Uganda bear out this 
assertion. Clearly, the LRA caused gross human rights violations in the Acholi region, 
Lango, Karamoja, and the Teso subregion.131 It is estimated that 1.6 million people were 
displaced and others killed in various conflicts in the Acholi region alone, and more than 
200 camps were created.132 For example, the attack on Barlonyo internally displaced a 
peoples’ camp in the Lira District and left 250 killed.133 The disruption of livelihood and 
loss of services and infrastructure because of such instabilities have created economic 
imbalance and a serious rift between the north and south. 
SALW facilitated the growth and persistence of the northern conflict organized by 
the LRA. The LRA carried out abductions, and targeted the civilians and forced them to 
support his rebellion. More than 6,000 children have been abducted, women raped, and 
young abducted girls turned into sex slaves. It is estimated that 1.4 million people, about 
90 percent of the northern Uganda population, were forced to stay in Internally Displaced 
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Camps by the government for easy protection.134 Stohl asserts that most small arms used 
by the LRA were sourced from Sudan and later proliferated to Uganda.135  
2. Effects of SALW on Governance 
Proliferation of illicit small arms by armed groups continues to threaten peace and 
security in Uganda, thus undermining effective governance. For example, the resources 
that are identified for development of infrastructures such as schools roads, and hospitals 
are diverted to handle civil conflicts and its related problems.  
To stymie the effects of such groups, the Uganda government resorted to 
investing more in building military capacity to deal with armed groups and terrorists at 
the cost of national development in the name of national security. Uganda made the 
defense budget a priority in solving conflicts and fighting armed groups and terrorists. 
High spending affected other important social economic sectors such as education, 
health, agriculture, and road infrastructure.  
The report of civil society organizations on economic cost in northern Uganda 
reveals that the country spent close to $ 1.33 billion in two decades to mitigate the effects 
of the LRA insurgency.136 The study further shows that due to over-spending on military, 
the government failed to improve on critical sectors that are necessary to attract foreign 
investment, especially the tourism sector.137 The retardation of economic growth 
consequently creates high levels of unemployment and disgruntled groups that continue to 
be recruited into criminal acts and furthering ineffective national security. 
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III. MEASURES TO STOP SALW PROLIFERATION AND 
HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IN UGANDA 
Control of SALW proliferation is a complex phenomenon. It continues to 
challenge the security architecture of both national governments and international 
stakeholders. Uganda’s efforts in combating SALW proliferation are multi-sector and 
integrated into regional strategies. This chapter recognizes the fusion between 
homegrown terrorism and the consequences of SALW proliferation. Though proliferation 
of SALW is not a primary cause of homegrown terrorism, it creates a lawless situation in 
which homegrown terrorism thrives. Therefore, because they are intertwined, it is prudent 
to address both problems simultaneously.  
Uganda’s measures to combat SALW proliferation comprise: legislative 
measures, military measures, civil society-based approaches, and regional and 
international cooperation. 
A. LEGISLATIVE MEASURES 
Different laws and regulations in Uganda contain provisions relevant to the 
control of SALW and terrorism. These laws include the Fire Arms Act of 1970 as 
amended in 2005, which lays down the punishments for illegal ownership of firearms, 
and other firearms-related offences.138 The amendment actualizes the government 
strategy to control SALW proliferation. The act is operationalized through the National 
Action Plan, the National Action Plan on Arms Management and Disarmament, and 
National Focal Point. 
a. The Fire Arms Act 
Following the widespread illegal use of small arms in urban terrorism and crimes 
of opportunity between 2000 and 2008 in the capital city of Kampala, the Fire Arms Act 
was amended to make it match with the magnitude of the threat. The amendment 
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provided the establishment of a joint task force consisting of the Uganda Police (UPF), 
Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF), the External Security Organization (ESO), and 
Internal Security Organization (ISO) to combat the vices of proliferation through joint 
operations and intelligence sharing.139 In addition, the government launched an inter-
agency security operation code named Operation Wembley, that significantly reduced the 
circulation of illegal guns from society by conducting cordon and search operations, snap 
check points, and operationalizing some provisions of amnesty law.140 The operation was 
grounded on provisions of the Uganda Fire Arms Act and had the support of international 
partners.141 As Ugandan Ambassador to UN Francis Butugira attests:  
In line with the UN program of Action, the Uganda government has 
amended and put in place regulations and laws with harsh punitive 
measures against illegal use and ownership of arms. Such laws include the 
Fire Arms Act 1970, the UPDF Act of 2005, and the Anti-terrorism statute 
of 2002 that reinforces the existing laws making it an act of terrorism, 
being in possession of arms and explosives with intention to advance 
terrorist cause. The statute provides for heavy penalties for offences of 
terrorism.142  
With the amendment of the Firearms Act of 1970 in 2005, illegal ownership of a 
gun has been criminalized and many people have been arrested and convicted, while 
others have taken advantage of the Uganda Amnesty Act, and others negotiated peace 
initiatives within the framework of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and 
Rehabilitation (DDRR) to voluntarily surrender guns to the government authorities.  
Corruption by government enforcement officers, however, still frustrate the 
recovery of small arms from the population as the police and some junior military 
officers connive with culprits to abet crime. For instance, the United Nations Human 
rights report revealed that junior UPDF and police officers were releasing suspects on 
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detention after extortion of about 15,000 Ugandan shillings (approximately 30 U.S. 
dollars).143 Furthermore, absence of active participation of civil institutions like the 
judiciary, Uganda Police and Prisons service, undermine the effectiveness of justice, law, 
and order in the disarmament processes.144  
b. The National Action Plan  
The National Action Plan (NAP) consists of the National Arms Management and 
the National Focal Point. The development of the National Policy on Arms Management 
in Uganda has assisted in the coordination of efforts to tackle the challenges of SALW 
proliferation. Such efforts include the National Action Plan on SALW and Focal Point on 
SALW, among others.145 The overriding objectives of NAP include:  
1) Tackling the enormous volume of weapons already in circulation; 2) 
Promoting responsible management of SALW; and 3) Promoting human 
security and political security and stability, which will include: support for 
peace building activities, conflict prevention, human rights and good 
governance, and social economic development.146  
At the international and regional levels, the National Action Plan coordinates and 
implements all protocols and programs pertaining to small arms; it acts as a liaison for all 
activities related to SALW in both national and international arenas to ensure smooth 
information sharing and coordination among stake holders.147 However, it is faced with 
such institutional challenges as untrained personnel and lack of harmonized law within 
the Great Lakes region. The National Action Plan stipulates its major areas of effort as, 
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“control and management of existing stock of SALW, reduction of volume of SALW 
already in circulation and prevention of future proliferation in Uganda.”148 The National 
Action Plan on arms management and disarmament is also obliged to “control 
management of existing stock whereby it focuses on the following items: small arms and 
law enforcement capacity building, SALW stockpile and surplus management, 
establishing a normative framework, regulating civilian ownership of SALW, and 
brokering and shipping agents.”149  
c. Stockpile Management 
The Ugandan government prioritized stockpile management as one of the 
effective methods of reducing illegal SALW in the society. In 2009, by improving 
stockpile management through building human resource capacity and record management 
of arms, the Ugandan government was able to destroy 75,783 SALW, 6,300 landmines, 
and 738 tons of ammunition.150 It also fostered strict adherence to procedures of 
stocktaking of arms that were captured, surrendered, or recovered to ensure that they 
were appropriately disposed; to this effect, 28,000 illicit SALW were recovered by UPDF 
in 2013.151 However, the challenge of having more guns proliferating from neighboring 
Kenya and South Sudan is still extant. 
d. Record Keeping and Gun Marking  
Effective proper record keeping and gun marking of government owned weapons 
significantly reduces the illegality of SALW ownership. With assistance of the 
International Tracing Instrument (ITI),152 government of Uganda gun marked 35,000 to 
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reduce the prevalence of circulation of illicit arms in the society.153 Gun marking has 
also helped in tracing state firearms that are being brought into illicit markets, and 
identifying gins being used to commit crimes. However, gun marking requires a lot of 
resources in terms of equipment, finance, and training. 
e. Licensing Policy 
To reduce levels of criminality exacerbated by an increased number of SALW in 
the country, the government of Uganda put in place a licensing policy that controls gun 
ownership. For an individual to be armed, they must first declare the intention to possess 
a firearm and undergo security background checks.154 Licensing policy limits are aware 
of people who possess guns, and who manufacture and deal in arms trade. 
f. Public Education and Awareness Program 
The National Focal Point is mandated to create public awareness and support 
systems with the aim of minimizing both demand and supply of small arms from the 
society. The core priorities of the program include:  
1) Reducing demand for small arms and establishing culture of peace; 
2) Developing a simplified guide to Uganda’s new firearms laws; and 
3) Conducting outreach to the media to encourage attention to the small 
arms issue, and coverage of the progress in implementing the NAP.155  
The approach has not fully attained the objective of stopping proliferation of 
SALW in Uganda, but it has achieved some results in areas that are especially vulnerable 
like the Karamoja region. People in the region are voluntarily surrendering illegal guns to 
the authorities, and cattle raids have been reduced as the population concentrates on other 
economic activities like farming. 
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B. MILITARY MEASURES  
To reduce illicit arms in the hands of Karamojongo communities, the Ugandan 
government embarked on a disarmament program using the army within the Karamoja 
region. By 2013, the Army had recovered 7,200 illegal guns. Searching, identifying, and 
voluntary disarmament have been the main modes of operation. This exercise, though 
military in nature, was later modified to incorporate anti-poverty strategies for its 
sustainability.  
The security forces joined with NGOs and local government administrative 
structures to provide social services and critical infrastructure that were necessary for 
economic development. These steps were aimed at providing alternative sources of 
livelihood to affected communities to assist in abandoning the gun trade culture.156  
C. CIVIL SOCIETY-BASED APPROACH 
Civil society groups are active players in the control of small arms circulation in 
the communities through dialogue and education. Civil society actively participated in 
educating the communities about the threats and effects of illicit arms, and by virtue of 
their closeness to the population, they facilitated recovery of guns through the creation of 
confidence that citizens are free to give information or surrender guns voluntarily.157 The 
Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Program (KIDDP) emphasized 
programs that were aimed at eradicating poverty. The Karamoja Integrated Disarmament 
Development Plan contributed to the National Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), 
and explained the Karamaja part of the National Peace Recovery and Development Plan 
(PRDP) for northern Uganda.158 The program fostered implementation of professional 
disarmament and was aimed at sustainable development.  
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D. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION  
The Ugandan government has embraced regional and international cooperation to 
enhance information sharing, interaction, and analysis of intelligence concerning 
proliferation of small arms, and includes cross border task forces and carrying out joint 
operations. Regionalism has established a framework to combat cross-border small arms 
and light weapons proliferation. Specifically, Uganda is party to such measures as the 
Nairobi Protocol, the East African community, and the Tripartite plus Commission.  
1. The Nairobi Protocol 
The Nairobi Protocol is an instrumental regional framework on SALW that 
enhances regional interactions of stakeholders in SALW, information sharing, and fast 
trucking best practices for implementation.159 The protocol necessitates its member states 
to incorporate the following aspects in their legal framework.160  
1) Ban on civilian ownership of automatic and semi-automatic rifles; 
2) Registration of all arms; 3) Restriction of the number of guns a person 
can own; 4) Regulation of security companies; and 5) Standardized 
marking and identification of small arms.161  
2. East African Community Initiative 
East African Community member states continue to be in the forefront in 
supporting both national and regional efforts in the combat of SALW proliferation and 
working towards regional stability. The East African community comprises Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda, and recently South Sudan has joined to benefit 
from regional integration and strengthening its political and economic stability. The East 
African Community has a joint secretariat that facilitates multi-sector approaches to 
control SALW. The EAC further provides a platform of a regional coordinated approach 
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to minimize SALW in Uganda and its neighbors. Under the Nairobi Protocol, the 
community has attempted to combat SALW proliferation and create peace in the East 
African region. However, the implementation process is faced with absence of uniform 
disarmament time table and strategy. Guns continue to shift from place to place, making 
the problem of SALW proliferation in East Africa more complex to fight. 
Through regional cooperation, the East Africa police chiefs formed an 
organization that has promoted, strengthened, and perpetuated co-operation, and fostered 
combined approaches for effective control of all forms of borders and related crimes with 
regional implications. In addition, it has led to improved information sharing, the 
formation of regional counterterrorism center, and member countries in the region have 
come up to fight all terrorist groups in the region such as ADF and control of SALW in 
the region. 
3. The Tripartite Plus Commission 
In its continuous efforts to reduce small arms in circulation and its attendant 
problems, the government of Uganda joined the Tripartite plus Commission, a body that 
is responsible for the DDRR of ex-combatants and militias in Great Lakes region.162 The 
basic purpose of the commission is to maintain a coordinated mechanism for regional 
stability. The joint venture, however, has not yielded much because of proxy and civil 
wars in the region that act as a major source of small arms. In addition, the commission is 
constrained by both human and materiel to realize its goals. It relies on donor funding 
from the U.S. government that is inconsistent and inadequate. Because of such 
constraints, the commission has so far not achieved its intended mission. 
E. MEASURES AGAINST HOMEGROWN TERRORISM 
The Uganda’s response to homegrown terrorism and SALW proliferation is 
shaped by the strategic environment. In an effort to combat homegrown terrorism, 
measures to control SALW proliferation were fused within counterterrorism measures 
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because the effects of illicit small arms could not appeal for international and regional 
support. The Ugandan government applies an entire government approach to respond to 
terrorism and proliferation of SALW, including military, intelligence coordination, 
political, legal, and engagement with both regional and international stakeholders Global 
War on Terror.  
Uganda’s counterterrorism measures are anchored in its strategic relationship with 
the population that recognizes the people as the first line of defense. In all efforts against 
terrorism, the government ensures that the people are mobilized to understand the threat 
and support the cause, and to identify and isolate terrorists while homegrown terrorism 
and SALW proliferation bear some differences; however, its effects on the society are 
similar. Thus, the government of Uganda applies cross-cutting measures to combat both 
crimes. 
1. Military Approaches to Counterterrorism 
Uganda applies military power when other instruments have failed to yield the 
desired strategic policy objectives, or when necessary to complement the effectiveness of 
the other instruments. It may also be used to achieve national or international objectives 
and may be applied in the form of deterrence, coercion, and confrontation.  
a. Deterrence Measures 
Deterrence involves demonstrating preparedness and willingness to use military 
power to discourage adversaries from taking hostile actions, since the risk of carrying out 
a specific course of action is not worth the potential consequences. The UPDF contributes 
to deterrence through partnership with the people, maintaining a flexible offensive and 
defensive posture, and building local and international alliances and partnerships. 
Uganda’s participation in AMISOM is in consonance with the deterrence principle. This 
approach reduces illicit SALW inflow and combats homegrown terrorism. For example, 
the intervention of the African Union Task force fighting against the LRA, and support of 
U.S. government, has neutralized the terrorist capacity to attack, and reduced the 
proliferation of arms by LRA in the region. In addition, AMISOM efforts in pacifying 
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Somalia have reduced small arms inflow from conflicted areas to the whole region that 
supports the growth of homegrown terrorism. 
b. Coercive Measures  
Coercive refers to the use of threat and force to constrain or dissuade adversaries 
from taking hostile actions. The UPDF is employing coercive strategies and actions to 
respond to threats to Uganda’s national interests such as small arms proliferation and 
homegrown terrorism. 
c. Confrontation  
Confrontation involves active application of military force to effectively defend 
and aggressively attack. Therefore, the UPDF maintains both offensive and defensive 
capabilities in readiness to respond to adversaries. Because of the overlap between these 
approaches, it is difficult to delineate the use of deterrence, coercion, or confrontation. It 
is therefore possible that a combination of two or all three will be required to achieve the 
desired end state.  
The Uganda government applied military approach to deal with terrorist groups 
such as ADF and LRA because their conventional operations were immensely 
threatening national security. The military approach was aimed at neutralizing the threat, 
dealing with the infiltration of terrorists and illicit arms, along our porous borders as an 
effective measure to combat terrorism.163 The military measure also integrates other 
security agencies to detect, deter, and defeat terrorists, especially homegrown. 
Multiagency cooperation plays a significant part in defeating homegrown terrorism and 
control of illicit SALW. Isoke attests that, “Joint military/police deployment enhance 
target hardening and visibility of the forces; it also acts as a strong deterrence measure 
against terrorism.”164  
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However, Tumushabe argues that military approaches that are preemptive cannot 
achieve the final defeat of the terrorist groups and small arms proliferation in Uganda 
because they deal with the symptoms rather than the cause.165 For example, killing of 
senior military leaders in both LRA and ADF ranks by UPDF did not lead to a conclusive 
defeat of the groups.166 Additionally, the asymmetric strategy of terrorist operations 
remains one of the challenges facing conventional military forces. 
2. Intelligence Coordination  
Credible intelligence is essential in unpacking terrorist cells, and the movement of 
illicit arms, motives, and intended targets. The Ugandan intelligence community is 
hinged on the trust, confidence of the population, and support from political leadership. It 
is also strengthened by a viable intelligence sharing mechanism like joint intelligence 
centers. The Uganda National Security Act of 2000 established various security agencies 
and mechanisms to collect and manage intelligence regarding national security.167 The 
Security Organization Act of 1987 provided for the establishment and roles of 
Intelligence organs such as Military Intelligence, the Criminal Intelligence Department 
(CID), the ISO, and the ESO.168 Under the Security Organization Act, the organizations 
are mandated to collect, gather, and analyze domestic and foreign intelligence into 
actionable intelligence to be consumed by top leadership to take appropriate action. 
Specifically, military intelligence is tasked with the execution of military challenges and 
tasks to look at general intelligence.169 To enhance the effectiveness of intelligence, the 
government established the Joint Anti-terrorism Task Force (JATT) to enhance 
coordination and intelligence sharing among the agencies on matters of terrorism. The 
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force comprises members from all security and intelligence bodies, including members 
from the immigration department and Directorate of Public Prosecution. 
The formation of JATT and JIC has facilitated a significant role in bringing 
together intelligence services and combating terrorism. However, the operations of JATT 
have been highly criticized by human rights activists alleging human rights violations; 
therefore, it has become a dilemma to fight terrorism and balance the rights of terrorists. 
In summation, the performance of intelligence approaches in combating terrorism and 
other security threats will depend on availability of resources and revised laws that 
protect intelligence services in executing their mission. 
3. Police Operations 
The Uganda Police enforces the law and keeps law and order. During efforts of 
combating homegrown terrorism and illicit small arms, the police are the leading agency. 
Sister agencies that work hand-in-hand with the police include Military Intelligence (MI), 
the ISO, the ESO, and Crime Intelligence.170 According to the Security Organization 
Act, the agencies are further responsible for collecting and processing of intelligence both 
domestic and foreign, and forward analyzed data for leadership actions. 
Because of increased transnational and homegrown terrorist attacks, the 
Counterterrorism Directorate was established within the police force to deal with 
challenges of terrorism. Its departments include Aviation Authority Police Department, 
Crime Police, Canine Police, VIP Protection Police, and Bomb Disposal, with different 
skills and capabilities to handle the threats and challenges of terrorism.171 The police 
have been highly engaged in community policing and mobilization of communities in an 
effort to put the public on board in fighting terrorism through detection and quick 
reporting of any suspected terrorist activity or suspect.  
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Isoke observes that community policing and mass mobilization of citizens is the 
most effective way of fighting terrorism.172 Observation can also be effective in 
controlling SALW proliferation. In addition, heavy deployments of police, both 
uniformed and in plain clothes, have been deployed especially in areas that are likely 
terrorists’ targets such as markets, bus terminals, disco clubs, bridges, airports, and other 
key government installations. The presence of police and other sister security agencies 
have contributed much towards intelligence collection, detecting, countering terrorism, 
and controlling illicit small arms, though with some challenges. 
4. Political Approach 
Uganda’s membership in regional organizations like the East African Community 
(EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the International 
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and international organizations like the 
UN and the AU, are essential to its strategic environment. This membership opens 
opportunities to the benefits of the collective security environment and enables the 
projection of influence necessary to protect and safeguard Uganda’s interests.  
The Ugandan government is using diplomatic relations as a tool to build 
international networks and strengthening cooperation among states in the fight against 
terrorism and the control of proliferation of SALW. The concept of building diplomatic 
relations in fighting terrorism is supported by Cofer Black, who attests that through 
diplomatic relations among nations, terrorists are isolated and denied of any soft ground 
and resources to use for their persistence and survival.173 Uganda has been engaged in 
bilateral negotiations and relations with different states to join hands in combating 
terrorism and small arms proliferation. For example, the Ugandan government developed 
bilateral relations within the Great Lakes region in fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army.  
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Similarly, the Ugandan government partnered with the United States to combat 
LRA, a homegrown terrorist group. The U.S. government has supported Uganda by 
deploying 100 commandos to help UPDF to conduct special operations against LRA in 
the jungles of DRC and CAR. In addition, the United States plays a significant role by 
helping the Ugandan government in training, providing logistics, and collecting of 
technical intelligence in neutralizing LRA and other terrorist groups.174 Other countries 
in bilateral relations with Uganda are Britain, France, Canada, Kenya, and Ethiopia.175 
Through bilateral relations, Uganda has been able to control its borders and neutralize 
terrorism threats; however, its limitation has been a lack of effective counterterrorism 
strategy in fighting terrorism. 
5. Legal Approach 
Confronted with the challenges of securing national security from the ADF, the 
LRA, Al-Shabaab terrorists, and other groups owning guns illegally, the Ugandan 
government enacted a number of laws to help in combating terrorism and controlling 
proliferation of SALW, protecting the rule of law, and protecting human rights. The 
Constitution provides the primary legal framework that guides the development of 
specific instrument to address the challenges of terrorism and SALW proliferation. In 
addition, other legal provisions include the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), the Anti-money 
Laundering Act (2013), the Communication Monitoring Act (2010), and the Ugandan 
Citizenship and Immigration Act (2009). 
a. The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002)  
The Anti-Terrorism Act clearly defines terrorism as “any act of violence or threat 
of violence carried out for the purpose of influencing government or intimidating the 
public and for any political, religious, social and economic aim, indiscriminately without 
due regard for the safety of others or property.”176 The Act criminates every individual or 
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terrorist group that promotes terrorism related activities.177 Specifically, section 2(i) 
clause (c) states, “any act involving the use of fire arms or explosion.”178  
The Anti-terrorism Act has done a tremendous job and it proves to be most 
appropriate and effective measure in combating terrorism and control illegal ownership 
of arms because since its inception, many terrorist suspects have been prosecuted and 
convicted in courts of law. This act and its punitive measures has made the Public to 
understand the dangers of associating with terrorism and has further reduced cases of 
illegal possession of arms and activities relating to terrorism.  
However, Tumushabe argues that the Anti-Terrorism Act does not bring out 
clearly a difference between general criminality and terrorism.179 Tumushabe further 
observes that the Ant-terrorism act however, has been highly criticized by civil society 
organizations for example human right activists, and the opposing politicians have been 
propagating it as tool to weaken the opposition and undermine democratic principles in 
the country.180  
b. The Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2013 
There is growing nexus between transnational organized crimes like money 
laundering and homegrown terrorism. The Anti-Money Laundering Act ensures that 
funding of terrorist activities is significantly limited and allows the development of 
programs against money laundering.181 Terrorists finance their activities through illegal 
transfers of money and illicit trade such as drugs and arms. The Ugandan government 
ratified the Anti-Money Laundering Act to re-enforce the Anti-Terrorism Act in 
combating terrorist activities and illegal procurement of arms. Among others, the Act 
provided for the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Authority Department in 
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charge of fraud to collect intelligence reports relating to money laundering in banking.182 
To be more effective, the act provides for life imprisonment, freezing of accounts, and 
closing of banking institutions.183  
The law has greatly minimized cases of money laundering in supporting terrorist 
activities, and it has lowered the criminality rate associated with money and ultimately 
reducing funding terrorist activities within Uganda. However, Henry Isoke observes that 
banking institutions face a problem of corruption and poor management of records for 
easy tracking, and these factors hinder intelligence services from closely monitoring all 
financial transactions taking place within banking systems. Currently, money is being 
transferred from one person to the other through mobile money services across the world, 
which becomes hard to monitor.184 Growing technology has made fighting terrorism to 
its final defeat almost impossible in Uganda and in the Great Lakes region. 
c. The Interceptions of Communications Act (2010) 
The Interceptions of Communications Act was passed following various terrorist 
attacks that left the Citizens of Uganda in a state of fear. It was enacted purposely to 
allow Intelligence services to have access, to monitor, and intercept suspected terrorists-
related communications.185 Currently, the Act enables easy tracking of arms dealers, and 
eases investigations of criminal acts associated with arms. However, the Act is being 
criticized by human rights activists and politicians, who refer to it as gross violation of 
human rights and an intrusion into private life and civic freedom. For example, a citizen 
may be worried to communicate freely if the government is monitoring the telephones.  
Despite all criticisms, the Act has achieved much in Uganda by preventing, 
curtailing, detecting, and investigating more terrorist attacks, though with some 
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challenges. Tumushabe further observes that the Act gives a mandate to the National 
Security Agencies to protect rights and fundamental freedoms of all Ugandans and to 
protect strategic national interests. 
d. The Uganda Citizens and Migration Act (2009) 
The Uganda Citizens and Migration Act defines the citizens of Uganda and 
further emphasizes migration issues, and considers control measures against illegal 
immigrants and refugees from South Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, and DRC who enter 
illegally with illicit arms that facilitate homegrown terrorism. Because of porous borders 
that make it easier for potentially disruptive groups to cross into the country, the Act 
makes it harder for illegal immigrants who use illegal borders.186 In addition, the 
government has instituted robust border measures such as heavy deployment by police, 
military, and immigration officers to control illegal entries, and technical systems that 
identify individuals known as Personal Identification Secure Comparison System 
(PISCES), which can effectively track and identify transnational terrorists via their 
passports.187  
F. REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES 
To deal with transnational terrorism and SALW proliferation, the Ugandan 
government is engaging regional efforts to combat growing terrorism. Transnational 
terrorism can be thwarted through regional efforts and bilateral engagements and 
cooperation.188 Regional bodies and African countries have adopted a regional strategy 
by enhancing cooperation to fight transnational terrorists in the region such as Al-
Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. This regional strategy is articulate by and through African Union 
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Organization, of which Uganda is a member. This section discusses regional 
counterterrorism measures. 
1. African Union
Uganda, as an active player in the continental security and peace initiatives, 
continues to nurture functional relationships with regional and international forces to 
produce and strengthen alliances and partnerships that will contribute to peace and 
security. Prominent African counterterrorism measures include the African Center for 
Study and Research of Terrorism, AMISOM, and African Union Strategic partners. 
a.      African Union Forces
Uganda is a leading country in the Regional Task Force (AU-RTF), responsible
for ending a two-decade LRA insurgency. It is also a leading troop-contributing country 
in AMISOM, with close to 6,220 troops inside Somalia. The participation of Uganda in 
the regional peace-keeping mission significantly reduced the transnational capabilities of 
both LRA and A Shabaab. Somalia was the major source of both small arms and 
terrorists that destabilized Uganda and the Great lakes region as LRA destabilized 
northern Uganda. However, the lack of adequate force enablers and multipliers still limit 
the operational potential of African peace keeping missions. The support from the United 
States government of 100 Special Forces operators in addition to materiel has improved 
the situation, but more is still needed. 
b. The African Center for Study and Research of Terrorism
In July 2004, under the legal frame work of African Union, the ACSRT was 
established to work under the African Union Commission. The center through national 
focal points was responsible for coordination of all stake holders and analysis of growing 
terrorist groups in combating terrorism such as the UN Counterterrorism Committee 
(CTC) and European Union (EU). Patrick Kimungunyi noted that, the center is further 
responsible for the following: 
a) Organizing functions aimed at improving counterterrorism capacities
and cooperation among AU member states; b) providing capacity-building 
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assistance to enhance national and regional capabilities; c) creating a 
mechanism for all member states to access expert guidance; d) building a 
database to facilitate sharing of intelligence and other related terrorism 
information; e) harmonizing and standardizing domestic legal framework 
within AU member states and international counterterrorism frameworks; 
and f) disseminating counterterrorism research across the continent.189  
The ACSRT has not achieved much in fulfilling its tasks to effectively combat 
terrorism in Africa because it lacks financial support to run the activities of the center. 
Basically, the center depends on donations from allies such as the European Union.190 
This has limited the capacity building of the center to catch up with the challenges of 
terrorism on the continent since donations are not always available, and member states 
are financially too weak to support themselves. 
2. African Strategic Partners 
As mentioned earlier, partners that financially support the African Union include 
the United States, the European Union, and the UN. To be specific, the United States 
government has persistently continued to support the Ugandan government and is 
currently providing training, financial support, logistics, and technical advice in 
combating terrorism and SALW proliferation. Through regional strategic partnerships, a 
combined joint task force was established in the Horn of Africa and in East Africa to 
handle terrorism related threats. It is estimated that during the financial years 2010–2014, 
the United States has released $8.72 million to fight the LRA terrorist group, which is a 
major contributor of illegal arms.191 Support by the U.S. government has made a 
tremendous positive difference in neutralizing the LRA terrorist group and diminishing 
the illicit small arms inflow. 
Similarly, in view of such security threats, the European Union adopted a strategy 
aimed at solving conflicts caused by SALW in Africa by promoting good governance 
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focused on the social economic transformation in Somalia, and addressing issues of 
governance as a solution to counterterrorism. In implementing the strategy, the EU is 
further focus on preventing, protecting, pursuing, and responding to any terrorist 
threat.192 It is estimated that in the year 2014, it spent 721 million pounds on AMISOM 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALW 
PROLIFERATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM 
The relationship between SALW and homegrown terrorism is more complex and 
intersects law enforcement and counterterrorism. SALW proliferation causes lawless 
situations that are exploited by homegrown terrorists to strike their targets of opportunity. 
The coercive potential of these illegal weapons continues to facilitate homegrown 
terrorists and criminal-minded groups to abuse human rights and perpetuate murders. The 
killing of Ugandan anti-terrorist prosecutor Joan Kagezi and anti ADF Muslim clerics in 
Uganda, between 2015–2016, bears this assertion.  
A. NEXUS BETWEEN SALW PROLIFERATION AND HOMEGROWN 
TERRORISM 
The 21st century has witnessed the growth in the symbiotic relationship between 
homegrown terrorists and transnational organized crime cartels manifesting in the form 
of SALW proliferation, illicit drug vending, money laundering, and cyber-related 
crimes.194 In Africa’s Great Lakes region, members of the ADF and Al Shabaab are 
involved in organized crime activities and illicit economies in eastern DRC and Somalia, 
respectively, using Uganda as a transit route.195 Similarly, the mushrooming numbers of 
organized crime cartels are involved in acts of violence. Transnational organized crime 
has thus become a major partner of terrorist groups globally and in eastern Africa. 
Homegrown terrorism and SALW proliferation, though motivated by different factors, 
are no longer so divergent in terms of their consequences to society. SALW remains the 
literal weapon of choice for both transnational organized criminals and homegrown 
terrorists. 
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There is a clear nexus between SALW and homegrown terrorism in the sense that 
terrorists take advantage of the fragile political and security situation to radicalize, 
recruit, and target their victims. For instance, the ADF often manipulates clan ethnic and 
religious conflicts to build its terror capabilities and gain support from Salafist sections of 
the Muslim group.196 Unemployed youth in Uganda are still victims or culprits of both 
small arms dealings and illegal activities, including homegrown terrorist planning and 
working with intelligence cells for small tokens to meet such basic needs as shelter, food, 
education, and medical care.197  
As the ADF case shows, the growth of homegrown terrorism and SALW 
proliferation in Uganda are facilitated by geographical and demographical factors. For 
example, the central and eastern Uganda has a strong Islamic domination with profound 
Islamic ideology and strong support that facilitate the growth of ADF homegrown 
terrorism.198 The ADF resorts to use of small arms because they are easily accessible and 
facilitate the achievements of their objectives.199 ADF still leverages the ungoverned 
space in eastern DRC and it derives its weaponry capabilities from its intimate 
relationship with former ex-combatants and anti-government militia.200  
Similarly, since 1987, under the leadership of Joseph Kony, the LRA as a terrorist 
group meted several atrocities to civilians as it waged war to overthrow the Ugandan 
government, and restore the mythical government based on Ten Commandments.201 The 
LRA persisted for so long because it capitalized on the conflicts in South Sudan where 
SALW were easy to access and other logistics were available to advance its interests. 
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B. CONFLICT, CRIME, AND SALW PROLIFERATION 
SALW are significant drivers of conflict in Uganda. Both intrastate and interstate 
have bedeviled conflicts in Uganda since independence has been driven by the easy 
accessibility and proliferation of SALW within Ugandan society. The extant inter-ethnic 
conflict in western Uganda among the Bakojo and Bamba tribes in the foothills of 
Ruwenzori Mountains, the skirmishes of north eastern Uganda between the Itesots and 
the Karamojong warriors, and 20-year insurgency in northern Uganda by LRA, 
showcases the significance of SALW in escalating conflict. 
Similarly, in northwest Uganda where the Uganda National Liberation Front and 
West Nile Bank Front armed groups dominated since the fall of Ida Amin in 1979, West 
Nile region has been experiencing a series of armed rebellions, conflicts, and crimes 
because of illegal small arms in the community. Following the people’s protracted war 
led by the National Resistance Army (NRA) that took over in 1986, the Uganda National 
Liberation Front a rebel group (UNLF) re-emerged in 1988. Hostilities with the 
government of Uganda continued and were further complicated by the emergence of a 
second insurgent group, the West Nile Bank Front. (WNBF); however, the rebel groups 
were decisively defeated by the NRA/UPDF. West Nile is now generally considered to be 
in the post-conflict phase, as it borders on all sides with areas that are also conflict prone. 
It continues to be affected by the spillover of other conflicts in the form of large-scale 
refugee populations from both DRC and Sudan.  
There are many SALW circulating within communities in the region and more 
among the pastoral communities in the Great Lakes Region and in the Horn of Africa. 
The guns that acquired through inter-clan skirmishes and raids especially in the Karamoja 
region were later sold to criminals and more often ended up facilitating homegrown 
terrorism.202These conflicts associated with SALW occur in the border areas of North-
Eastern Uganda and the Western parts of the Kenya border, which have left people dead, 
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and others injured or displaced.203 My close analysis of disarmament measures reveals 
the following shortfalls: 1) failed to tackle the primary source of arms; 2) ad hoc 
implementation that did not provide holistic implementation strategies to integrate all 
countries and stakeholders, and did not address issues related to the demand side, but 
instead emphasized the supply side.  
C. REGIONAL FACTORS 
The absence of regional practical strategy to deal with the question of 
management of ex-combatants will continue to frustrate any policy intervention to stop 
SALW proliferation and homegrown terrorism. The two intertwined vices have grossly 
undermined the security of Uganda, despite the government approach of conducting and 
implementing Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration. 
Homegrown terrorists continue to camouflage in SALW proliferation by refugees, 
illegal migrants, and militias. The line between the homegrown terrorism activities and 
consequences of SALW to the society continues to be blurred. Terrorists, disguised as 
refugees, enter the country to activate their cells. For example, the culprits of the July 
2010 Kampala attacks entered Uganda as Somali refugees, hence attracting less security 
surveillance.204 Similarly, the same mode was used to attack Garissa University in 
Kenya.205 The sustainable solution to SALW and homegrown terrorism in East Africa 
lies in the creation of a secure and peaceful strategic environment in the Somalia and 
entire horn of Africa. Somalia today remains as a major corridor for SALW in the Great 
Lakes Region. I believe there is credible evidence that Somali-terrorists, like the Al-
Shabaab terrorists, have cells and grounds where they train and recruit, funded through 
drug and small arms trafficking.  
Globalization has complicated immigration management terrain in Uganda. It 
now includes a large mobile population of political and economic refugees and casual 
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labor migrants. It also involves human trafficking, dumping illegal immigrants from 
neighboring countries, and calls for greater collaboration between states to improve 
national and regional security. The propensity for cross-border violence has been a 
common occurrence along Uganda’s borders, especially to the South Western Region 
with persistent conflicts in Eastern DRC and in Burundi. Some of the refugees are ex-
combatants fleeing from the frontlines, and often they attempt to sell or barter weapons in 
the refugee settlement camps, hence complicating the security situation. Refugee 
settlement camps like Nakivale in Western Uganda are losing civilian posture into centers 
of radicalization and negative ethnic mobilization, which is a recipe for increasing 
homegrown terrorism.206 
Although border security is a critical aspect of promoting national security, it has 
generally been given less priority compared to other sectors. The decreased attention to 
border security has largely contributed to a prevalence of cross-border threats such as 
cross-border crimes, proliferation of illegal arms, drugs, terrorists, influx of refugees, and 
illegal immigrants.207 For example, the border between Kenya and Somalia limits the 
inflow of refugees escaping the volatile political situation in Somalia. Because of security 
lapses, terrorists cross freely without being noticed and go on to terrorize the East African 
region. 
Like elsewhere in Uganda, the southwestern Ugandan borders with DRC, 
Rwanda, and Tanzania are characterized by a high level of porosity, unclear border 
demarcations, and poor border management mechanism, thus making it easy to 
experience cross- border instability spillovers. Securing the entire border from threats of 
terrorists, negative armed groups, illegal migrant require multidimensional efforts and 
resources. Uganda must strive to prevent instability from neighboring states spreading 
into the country as the most viable option of defending its borders. Emphasizing the post-
                                                 
206 Jonn, Drury, and Williams Richards, “Children and Young People who are refugees, internally 
displaced persons or survivors or perpetrators of war, mass violence and terrorism.” (2012), 10–
16.doi:10.1097/YCO.0b013e328353eea6 
207 Mareike, Schomerus, and Lotje Devrie. “Improving Border Security: A Situation of Security 
Pluralism along South Sudan’s Borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo,” (2014), 
http://www.Eprints.ise.ac.ok/56338/1/schomerus_improvising border security_2014.pdf. 
 58
entry management of all immigrants is not necessary, but is critical for sustainable border 
security. There is no internal enforcement system, and thus, it is simple for terrorists and 
SALW to infiltrate the country. The border police and meager migration control 
department are disjointed in the operations. Given the significance of borders, the 
government lacks the initiative measures that are robust enough to combat both terrorism 
and SALW proliferation including a border security agency and electronic surveillance 
systems.  
The civil conflict in South Sudan and Burundi, and the presence of the LRA in the 
jungle of CAR, in addition to perennial presence of negative militias in eastern DRC, 
bears out this model, as well. Illicit SALW change hands easily due to the absence of 
strong state control in fragile spots. For instance, Thokozan Thusi argues that “the 
mistrust and suspicion between two countries created conflicts, and the conflicts have 
been reflected in each government accusing each other of providing bases, logistic 
support, and arms to the adversary.”208  
Conflicts in each country have created insecurity and vicious cycles of violence 
and armament with grave regional implications and ultimately growth of homegrown 
terrorists. Similarly, in the DRC more than six countries participated in a war to fight the 
Kishasha government to overthrow President Mubutu. The effects of this conflict and 
arms proliferation manifested itself in gross increases in cases of human rights abuse. 
Conflicts have affected all countries in the Great Lakes Region, and have facilitated the 
growth of homegrown terrorists in Uganda. Nganga finds out credible linkages by 
pointing out assortment of weapons exchange in the conflict zones especially the Air 
Defense Systems that are widely used by homegrown terrorists and conflicts in the 
region.209 Conflict entrepreneurs continue to profit from illegal small arms trade taking 
advantage of conflict situations. The presence of factors that cause conflicts still frustrate 
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the measures and energies to reduce the scale of SALW proliferation and homegrown 
terrorism 
D. EFFECTS OF WEAK GOVERNANCE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 
In Uganda and the Great Lakes Region, poverty has become endemic with the 
persistence of corruption that attracts SALW proliferation and homegrown terrorists.210 
Dealers of illicit small arms and terrorists bribe the immigration officers and local 
security officials to advance their interests. East Africa being one of the countries in 
Africa with weak economies, the region is a bleeding ground of illicit SALW and 
homegrown terrorism. However, leaders in the region have not believed that poverty is 
linked to terrorism.211 At least in the region of East Africa and Uganda, poverty, poor 
governance, social injustices, and imbalances in economic development enhances the 
ability for religious extremists to radicalize and build local support that supports 
homegrown terrorism.212 In addition, inadequate salaries and wages for immigration staff 
and security personnel, and general poverty compromises their integrity and increases 
widespread corruption that in turn creates a climate favorable for SALW proliferation and 
homegrown terrorism.213 
Much of the SALW that threatens the Great Lakes Region and Uganda in 
particular originated from conflicts often involving regular forces such as insurgencies, 
criminal gangs, and Islamic militants. It is in such an environment that homegrown 
terrorism has flourished. It was the breakdown of the government apparatus in Somalia 
that ushered the Al-Shabaab terrorists into the region. Similarly, failing states of Eritrea, 
South Sudan, Eastern DRC, and Burundi continues to act as a supply source for SALW 
while opening up for potential homegrown terrorism. The Uganda security forces have a 
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weak oversight mechanism to monitor the illicit flow of guns, and they have been 
grappling with allegations of corruption and proliferating arms to unauthorized users 
especially in urban centers and operation areas.214  
On several occasions, the Uganda government has given out weapons for self-
defense to certain communities that were threatened by armed groups. For example, when 
the LRA extended to the Lango rand Teso Regions, the government could not provide 
security to the population. The government decided to arm communities and created 
home guards. These weapons distributed among ill-trained home guards were the same 
arms that were misused by some of the wrong characters to terrorize the country. Others 
escaped with the guns and joined armed rebellions and thus, the emergence of 
homegrown terrorists came about. The absence of proper mechanisms of transparency, 
accountability of government arms, coupled with diverting resources intended for 
combating SALW and homegrown terrorism, has a broad implication for security. To 
effectively combat such challenges requires effective governance, accountability, 
professional security forces, and cooperation of civilian oversight.  
From the policy perspective, the reviewed policies and measures to combat both 
SALW proliferation and homegrown terrorism reveal mismatch between the government’s 
policies and the situation on ground. For example, the military approach to disarm the 
Karamojong have not yielded the conclusive results, and has earned a lot of criticism from 
civil society because of human rights abuses that are associated with forced disarmament. 
Most of the policies, laws, and measures by the government and strategic partners are elitist 
based, and lack community norms and rituals. Owing to the fact that local communities are 
conduits, consumers and victims of SALW and its various interventions, and the efforts and 
views of local communities, and robust oversight mechanism by civil society are lacking 
and this laxity creates aground of insecurity  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter concludes by pointing out the cause-and-effect relationship between 
SALW proliferation and homegrown terrorism. It also highlights the silent areas in the 
findings, and makes possible recommendations. 
A. FINDINGS 
One finding in this thesis is that the proliferation of SALW was not only a factor 
that facilitated homegrown terrorism, it continues to be a driving factor. The proliferation 
of SALW has been a major cause for the majority death in recent wars and figures in 
much of the crime and civil violence that ultimately led to the growth of homegrown 
terrorism in Uganda and in the Great Lakes Region. Porous borders, ethnic clashes, 
regional conflicts, ungoverned spaces, and proliferation of illicit weapons in the region 
are the factors that facilitate SALW proliferation and homegrown terrorism.  
The continuous circulation of SALW into the hands of civilians and other 
unauthorized people is leveraged by a weak institutional and legal framework in Uganda 
and the Great Lakes Region. The illicit proliferation of SALW has had a negative impact 
on the peace and security of civilians in Uganda, especially those living in Northern, 
North East, and Western Uganda. In the western region, the Kasese district and 
Bundibugyo have continuously experienced constant ethnic conflicts. Proliferation of 
SALW is the major concern that has led to many deaths, disrupted their social fabrics, 
and hindered the social-economic development in most African countries where people 
are being terrorized on a daily basis, and Uganda has not been spared. To control SALW 
proliferation and the attendant effects in Uganda and the GLR, member countries in the 
region should strengthen cooperation and enforce information sharing on issues related to 
SALW and terrorism. The spirit of sharing information should be maintained at all levels 
such as strategic, operational, and tactical levels for effective monitoring. 
SALW have altered the security dynamics in Uganda and the Great Lakes Region. 
The less attention given to the problem by the regional leaders and international 
community has allowed it to escalate and magnify its effects on the population. Illegal 
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SALW continues to drive the conflicts in Somalia, Burundi, and South Sudan. 
Homegrown terrorists on the other hand, take a flirting opportunity of state fragility to 
mobilize, acquire arms, and attack their targets of opportunity. The sustainable panacea 
lies within the fact that the regional government must adopt the whole of government 
approach to combat the twin vices of small arms proliferation and home grown terrorism. 
While the security challenge emanating from SALW proliferation and 
homegrown terrorism is likely to remain a global concern, the consequences of 
homegrown terrorism and its related crimes on both states can be minimized through 
strengthening the cooperation between national, regional, and international stakeholders. 
In addition, cooperation among states in combating SALW proliferation and homegrown 
terrorism should be enforced, and non-compliant member states should be punished. The 
cooperation should further emphasize intelligence sharing and timely reporting, 
especially on any suspected immanent terrorist attacks. Reduction of illicit arms in the 
hands of the wrong people, requires an internationally and regionally agreed consensus 
on the restrictions of the sale of arms. Efforts by the United States, the European Union, 
and the United Nations to combat homegrown terrorism and SALW proliferation have 
been significant and have yielded positive results. The threat of SALW proliferation in 
the region however; remains extant and is likely to rejuvenate.  
The war against homegrown terrorism and illegal manufacture, and transfer of 
SALW can attain its intended objectives. Michael Ogu claims that “when sincere and 
responsible leadership, coupled with realistic policies and strategies, create a rule of law 
that reflect the needs and aspirations of individual citizens and states on the 
continent.”215 It will be difficult to reduce the illegal proliferation of SALW and 
terrorism in general in Uganda when neighboring countries in the Great Lakes Region 
and Africa as a continent still experience illicit proliferation of arms. However, such 
proliferation of SALW and terrorism can be tremendously curtailed if there is good 
governance, effective democracy, minimum welfare for the citizens, and when safety and 
needs of Africans are met. 
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Whereas there are tangible attempts to stop SALW proliferation and homegrown 
terrorism, the success of these efforts will need effective approaches that are rooted 
within human rights principles. These strategies should have a human face and be people 
focused, including long-term economic development of the regions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations target different stakeholders in the fight against SALW 
proliferation and homegrown terrorism at both the national and regional levels. This 
section also suggests ways to improve imperatives of state governance as a viable 
solution. 
1. National Level  
The Uganda government should put more emphasis on programs such as 
disarmament programs for both voluntary and forceful disarmament to reduce illegal 
arms in the communities. Such programs should have international and professional 
standards for their effectiveness. To implement such initiatives effectively, other 
countries in the region must adopt programs with international standards that address all 
security issues related to proliferation of SALW and homegrown terrorism. In addition, 
states in the region should ensure effective accountability of their SALW and monitoring 
capabilities of small arms inflow by improving border security through integrated 
computerized border management systems, deployment of enforcement officers, 
maintaining of military deployments to reinforce police, and migration officers along all 
porous borders. 
There is a need for the government of Uganda to craft strategic communication 
plans aimed at creating public awareness of the consequences of SALW proliferation and 
its linkage with homegrown terrorists. The plan should target both local community 
audiences and international stakeholders. 
The Ugandan government should strengthen oversight roles by civilian authorities 
over military operations to improve and enhance accountability and transparency on the 
information related to small arms transfers, procurement, and government expenditure 
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details on small arms.216 The oversight institutions limit unnecessary procurement of 
arms that may end up in the wrong hands.217 In addition, civil society should be allowed 
to check the government by accessing reports on small arms transfers on both national 
and international levels.218  
Uganda’s government should acquire the standard software system and modern 
equipment to establish a database of all state weapons. The system should have the 
capacity to connect all districts and regional registries within armed forces such as the 
army UPDF, the Uganda police, the Uganda prisons, and the wildlife wardens to the 
central registry for easy monitoring and control of state arms that are now the major 
source of illicit SALW. In addition, to have an effective system, countries in the region 
should commit enough resources in a building capacity in training professionals, updating 
the systems, and regular maintenance to avoid abuse. 
Uganda should review its legislations on possession and manufacture of SALW to 
be in line with the international instruments. Ugandan government laws and the 
regulation of SALW as documented in the Firearm Act of 1970, regulated the ownership 
and manufacturing of guns, and the illicit transfer of firearms and sale of 
ammunitions.219 However, much as the laws on arms protect the business entrepreneurs, 
they do not apply to brokers, who remain the primary actors in transfer of arms like in 
Kenya. Legally recognized dealers in Kenya and other neighboring countries are involved 
in brokering arms; and the law protects them.  
Uganda should strengthen its regional cooperation and international partnership 
with countries like the United States in fighting homegrown terrorism and SALW 
proliferation. The relationship should further be extended toward pacifying neighboring 
                                                 
216International Committee of the Red Cross. “Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict,”  (1999), 15–23, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
icrc_002_0734_arms_availability.pdf 
217 Ibid.  
218 Matt Schroecher and Guy Lamb, “The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise” African 
Analyst Quarterly.1. (2006): 68–78, https;//fas.org/asm/library/articles/schroederlamp.pdf. 
219 United Nations, “Implementing the UN Program of Action Commitments,” 10–15, 
http://www.ians.org/system/files/UNPoA-Eng.pdf. 
 65
states like South Sudan and Somalia that are experiencing conflicts and that act as the 
major sources of small arms that have a spillover effect on Uganda. 
2. Regional Level 
There is a need to have a joint mechanism of implementing regional programs for 
combating SALW and homegrown terrorism that are integrated with national and 
regional member states. This would promote security among the states in the region and 
advance post conflict reconstruction and good governance. This approach would further 
eliminate the situation where disarmament of one country is undermined by the lack of 
disarmament of another country, and yet they interact with each other across uncontrolled 
borders. 
Leaders in the Great Lakes region should embrace small arms nonproliferation 
policies such as the SALW Trade Treaty, and through regional cooperation, intelligence 
sharing, and joint operations against SALW proliferation and combating terrorism. To 
attain this, countries in the region should practice good governance that promotes 
regional cooperation where transparency, accountability, and democratic principles are 
respected, and the effective implementation of policies are able to handle security 
challenges. 
The East African parliament and other regional initiatives and mechanisms should 
emphasize the implementation of laws and regulations that control the proliferation of 
small arms and boost efforts to combat homegrown terrorism. Individual countries should 
further promote laws in line with regional framework to control and combat the vices.220 
The African Union should fast track harmonization of counterterrorism legislation 
in all member countries for mutual legal harmonization and extradition of terrorists. In 
addition, member states should implement existing recommendations on border control 
and management measures against terrorism and illicit inflow of small arms. There is a 
need to plan for and engage with the peace, security, and development nexus as a strategy 
for monitoring the sources of SALW, causes of homegrown terrorism, and transnational 
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terrorism. The existence of trans-boundary terror cells requires that regional member 
states conduct joint trainings on the methods of tracking and monitoring of terrorists. 
Effective monitoring of terrorist activities along cross-borders will assist early detection 
and maximize the possibility of replication of methods of attack in the region. 
Countries in the Great Lakes region should address social, political, and economic 
issues affecting the citizens, such as poverty, unemployment, and other governance issues 
that prompt some people to join terrorist groups and illegally sell arms. To nip the 
problems of SALW and homegrown terrorism in their bud, it is prudent to address the 
primary causes of conflicts such as unequal distribution of national resources, setting out 
viable land dispute management mechanisms, and addressing historical demographical 
distortions in regions perceived to be marginalized. The government of Uganda should 
develop a strategy to counteract the narratives of homegrown terrorism and gun culture. 
The complexity of SALW proliferation and homegrown terrorism continue to 
threaten the security of Uganda and the Great Lakes region. Therefore, combating the 
two vices requires both national and regional approaches to attain social, political, and 
economic development in the region.  
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